Stemming Terrorist Finance

Following the events of 9\11 individual countries and the international community became increasingly concerned about how best to prevent the funding of terrorist groups. Alternative remittance systems such as Hawala, where money is moved informally between a network of brokers in the Middle East, north Africa and south Asia have been identified as a potential source of terrorist financing leading to calls for greater regulation of such alternative remittance systems.

This book analyses the risk such alternative remittance systems pose in terms of terrorist financing, offering a detailed overview of the historical origins and methods of operation of alternative remittance systems or informal value transfer systems. The factors that have come to ensure that these systems have remained operationally viable in modern times are identified along with the risks they present balanced against an overview of their actual misuse for illicit purposes to date. The book presents a detailed critique of the UK framework for the regulation of these systems drawing where possible on existing data to assess the use and effectiveness of these measures in practice. A range of options for mitigating risks associated with specific remittance corridors is considered ranging from initiatives that promote remittances through the banking sector, to efforts to mitigate risk and the impact on the delivery of UK overseas development aid. The book concludes with key recommendations as to the effectiveness of the current regulatory framework within the UK viewed from the perspective of international efforts to secure the regulation of these systems, and in stemming terrorist finance as part of national and international counter-terrorism policy.