The Economics of Cyber Risk

Cyber incidents impose measurable economic and financial costs through operational disruption, litigation, valuation effects, and systemic spillovers. Understanding these costs requires that someone at the institution can connect technical vulnerabilities to market behavior and institutional responses. This volume provides guidance on cyber risk and financial stability, examining such costs from a markets-and-institutions perspective and linking incident outcomes to firm value, insurability, and policy. Contributed chapters explore market reactions to data breaches and class actions, risk quantification and mitigation (models, firm practices, and insurance), and sectoral cases in banking, construction, and power generation. Chapter authors synthesize frameworks and tools across BCBS operational risk and resilience principles, FSB incident response/lexicon, IMF macro-financial guidance, OECD digital security, and EU instruments (DORA, NIS2, EU-SCICF), alongside NIST CSF and FFIEC materials. The volume explores how policy and institutional design translate into incentives, incident reporting, resilience, and information sharing. Providing empirical evidence, financial-econometrics methods (abnormal returns/event studies), policy mapping, and risk-transfer analyses for cyber insurance, the book helps readers evaluate costs at the firm and system levels, interpret regulatory signals for financial institutions, and design governance and investment responses. It serves academics in finance/economics, policymakers, and practitioners seeking structured guidance on cyber risk and financial stability.